Mitchell Hamline Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 1

Article 10

2021

Jurisprudence and Recommendations for Tribal Court Authority
Due to Imposition of U.S. Limitations
Angelique EagleWoman
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, angelique.eaglewoman@mitchellhamline.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
EagleWoman, Angelique (2021) "Jurisprudence and Recommendations for Tribal Court Authority Due to
Imposition of U.S. Limitations," Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol. 47 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open
Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mitchell
Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information,
please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

JURISPRUDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
TRIBAL COURT AUTHORITY DUE TO
IMPOSITION OF U.S. LIMITATIONS
Angelique EagleWoman (Wambdi A. Was’teWinyan)ǂ
I.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 342
II.
QUESTIONING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURTS OF INDIAN
OFFENSES ................................................................................................ 344
A.
The Context of Shifting U.S. Indian Policies ........................... 345

B.
Courts of Indian Offenses as Assimilation Era Federal
Instrumentalities................................................................................... 347

III. TRANSITION TO INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT AND MODERN
TRIBAL COURTS ..................................................................................... 351
A.
The Operation of Tribal Courts ............................................... 352
B.
Tribal Appellate Courts ............................................................ 354
C.
Tribal Court Jurisdiction: Criminal and Civil ........................... 354
1.
Criminal Jurisdiction ............................................................. 355
2.
Civil Jurisdiction .................................................................... 357
3.
Public Law 280 and Impacts to Tribal Courts ...................... 357
D.
Customary/Traditional Law in Tribal Courts ........................... 360
IV. U.S. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE CIVIL
JURISDICTION OF TRIBAL COURTS ........................................................ 362

A.
The Montana Test for Jurisdiction over Non-Indians or NonMembers on Fee Lands ....................................................................... 363
1.
The Abstention Doctrine for Federal Courts and Exhaustion
of Tribal Court Remedies ................................................................ 364
2.
Judicially Created Limitations on the Extent of Tribal Court
Adjudicatory Authority..................................................................... 365
B.
U.S. Supreme Court’s Barring of Federal Claims in
Tribal Courts........................................................................................ 367
C.
The Flip Side: Enforcement of Tribal Orders by
Federal Courts ..................................................................................... 367

V.
QUESTIONING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR FEDERAL COURT REVIEW
OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION....................................................................... 369
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TWO PATHS
FORWARD OR ONE STEP BACK?............................................................ 371

A.
Current Quagmire of Creating Common Law Doctrine through
“Plenary Power” ................................................................................... 372
B.
Recommendation for Tribal and U.S. Full Faith and
Credit Treaty ........................................................................................ 373
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are over 570 federally-recognized Tribal Nations in the
United States and more than 330 tribal courts serving as the judicial branch
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of those nations. 1 Yet, there is little mention of the existence of tribal courts
in most mainstream civil procedure courses taught in the over 200 law
schools in the United States. To gain any knowledge as to the existence of
these courts, law students must take a course on federal Indian law, which
is not available in the majority of law schools. In fact, less than twenty law
schools offer a series of courses forming an Indian law program. 2 Thus, the
invisibility of tribal courts is perpetuated through curriculum omission in
mainstream civil procedure courses and rarely remedied through offering a
stand-alone course on federal Indian law. 3 Tribal Nations have existed from
time immemorial with their own laws, dispute resolution systems, and
governing structures. This lack of attention and suppression of information
serves only to reinforce colonizing ideas of subsuming tribal governance into
the forums set up by the United States.
This article will discuss the history of formal tribal courts as first
established to control American Indian populations in the late 1800s. 4 As
tools of oppression, the first judicial forums established on American Indian
reservations were the Code of Indian Offenses Courts, also known as the
C.F.R. Courts (Code of Federal Regulations Courts). 5 The Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 signaled a shift in policy, which provided for the
adoption of tribal constitutions. 6 Under the Department of Interior, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel developed boilerplate constitutions for
adoption by Tribal Nations. 7 These constitutions often included provisions
for the establishment of tribal courts.
Through U.S. Supreme Court decisions and federal laws, the
criminal and civil jurisdiction of tribal courts has been limited. The U.S.
This article is dedicated to the tribal sovereignty warriors working in Indian country to keep
our Indigenous legal traditions alive and strong. My Dakota name is included. I am a citizen
of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota Oyate and have Rosebud Lakota heritage.
See Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1200 (Feb. 1, 2019) (listing the 573 federallyrecognized Tribal Nations); see also Tribal Courts, TRIBAL COURT
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/justice.htm
[https://perma.cc/BHX4-FE8G] (providing a directory of tribal courts in the United States).
See The State of Indian Law at ABA-Accredited Law Schools, NAT’L NATIVE AM. BAR
ASS’N (2019), https://www.nativeamericanbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Final-Draft.State-of-Indian-Law-at-ABA-Accredited-Schools.-May-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6KB6L2H] (listing sixteen certificate Indian law programs and thirty-one law schools offering
more than one Indian law course at ABA-accredited law schools).
ǂ
1

2

3
4

Id.
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.04[3][c][iv][B], at 266–

67 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
5
6

Id.
See generally Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984, 25

U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (originally 25 U.S.C. § 261 et seq.).
See Frank Pommersheim, What Must be Done to Achieve the Vision of the Twenty-First
Century Tribal Judiciary, 7-WTR KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 12 (1997).

7
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Supreme Court has also opined that the U.S. Congress holds plenary
authority over American Indian Tribes. 8 Utilizing this authority, the U.S.
Congress has legislated federal criminal jurisdiction as concurrent on all
tribal lands with tribal court jurisdiction and has provided a mechanism to
delegate federal criminal jurisdiction to state legal systems. 9 In the civil
jurisdiction sphere, the U.S. Supreme Court has established processes for
federal courts to review tribal civil jurisdiction determinations and for the
refiling of cases from tribal courts to federal courts based on the status of
civil defendants as non-Indians or non-members. 10
Following a discussion on the history and function of tribal courts,
this article will examine the limitations on tribal court civil jurisdiction set
forth in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 11 Through a critical examination of
the U.S. authority and legal basis for review of tribal court determinations
or decisions, this article will provide commentary on the ungrounded nature
of the assertion of U.S. federal court review over tribal court decisionmaking. 12 Finally, the article will recommend a government-to-government
treaty agreement to set the framework for civil jurisdictional issues arising
between Tribal Nations and the United States. 13
II.

QUESTIONING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURTS OF
INDIAN OFFENSES

Legal scholars of federal Indian law divide U.S. Indian policy into
distinct periods to allow for a more cohesive understanding of legislative,
executive, and judicial actions. However, policies from former eras may
arise or continue into a time period viewed on the macro-level as a period
characterized by a policy shift. Therefore, the following U.S. Indian policy
eras offer an attempt at organizing the various actions of the branches of the
See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 380–82 (1886); see also Angelique EagleWoman, Bringing Balance to Mid-North
8

America: Re-Structuring the Sovereign Relationships Between Tribal Nations and the
United States, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 671, 678 (2012).
Without identifying any constitutional foundation, federal courts classify
the relationship between Tribes and the U.S. government as political,
and affirm that the U.S. Congress has ‘plenary’ authority over Tribes. In
the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Congress has the ability ‘[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes’ and this one phrase has been
stretched into ‘plenary’ authority over Tribal Nations.

Id.
See ANGELIQUE WAMBDI EAGLEWOMAN & STACY L. LEEDS, MASTERING
9

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 45-63 (2d ed. 2019).
Id. at 74–77.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
10
11
12
13
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U.S. government towards American Indians since the formation of the
United States.

A.

The Context of Shifting U.S. Indian Policies

U.S. Indian policy has been analogized to a perpetual wave
machine 14 or a pendulum swinging between two opposite poles. 15 On the
one side, the United States has recognized and engaged with Tribal Nations
on a government-to-government level. On the other side, there has been an
effort to completely disregard Tribal Nations’ authority, withhold federal
recognition, and undermine the protection of American Indian people and
Tribal governments. The table below illustrates the eras of U.S. Indian
policy and the relationship between the two opposing positions. 16
Government-to-Government
Relations
Treaty Era (sovereign-to-sovereign)
1778 to Mid-1800s

Disregard of Tribal Nation
Status
Removal Era
1800s

Reservation Era
1800s
Assimilation/Allotment Era
Late 1800s to Early 1900s
Indian Self-Government Era
1930s to 1940s
Termination
of
Tribal
Government Status Era
1940s to 1960s
Indian Self-Determination Era
Late 1960s to Present
During the treaty era, the U.S. engaged in negotiations and legal agreements
with Tribal Nations to establish peaceful alliances and eventually large

See JUDITH V. ROYSTER, MICHAEL C. BLUMM & ELIZABETH ANN KRONK,
NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 51
(3d ed. 2013) (“Like a perpetual wave machine, federal policy has flowed between two poles:
the protection of tribal autonomy on the one hand, and the incorporation and assimilation
of Indians into the majority society on the other.”).
See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 10.
Id. at 11–22.

14

15
16
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property transfers. 17 As the U.S. sought to expand its territorial jurisdiction
and rebuff land title claims by other European-derived governments, U.S.
officials entered into treaties as a means to expediently accomplish this
result, whereas American Indians engaged in treaty alliances as a form of
kinship recognition and shared territoriality. 18
In a series of three cases commonly referred to as the “Marshall
Trilogy,” the U.S. Supreme Court, under the authority of Chief Justice John
Marshall, fully extinguished tribal ownership of all lands within the territory
claimed by the United States, asserting that, as the successor of Great
Britain, the U.S. gained superior title through the “doctrine of discovery” to
tribal lands. 19 In the second case in the trilogy, the Court opined that the
Cherokee Nation and all tribal governments lacked constitutional standing
to sue in federal courts. 20 The Court coined the term “domestic dependent
nations” when dismissing the lawsuit brought to enforce U.S. treaty rights
disregarded by the state of Georgia in seizing tribal reservation lands. 21 The
third case in the trilogy established federal preemption over Indian affairs
in relation to state laws and recognized that tribal governments existed “as
distinct, independent political communities”—although under the
jurisdiction of the U.S. 22 These three decisions continue to form the
foundation of U.S. property rights and the assertion of jurisdiction over
tribal governments and remain good law in the United States.
With the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction on the eastern seaboard,
the next policy in Indian affairs was to remove all Tribal Nations to locations
west of the Appalachian mountain range and eventually beyond the
Mississippi River. 23 The removal era overlapped with the reservation era, in
which federal officials and courts recognized the reserved lands as fully
under the jurisdiction of Tribal Nations in regard to domestic affairs. 24 The
extent of this jurisdiction will be discussed in the sections on criminal and
civil jurisdiction below. 25

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 11–13.
Id. at 12.

Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572–74, 584 (1823).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13 (1831).

Id.

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832).

See Indian Removal Act of May 28, 1830, §§ 2, 7, Pub. L. No. 21-148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).

The online resource for treaties between Tribal Nations and the U.S. is available through
the Oklahoma State University digital collection of editor Charles Kappler, online at:
https://dc.library.okstate.edu/digital/collection/kapplers.
See infra Sections III.C.1, III.C.2.
24

25
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Federal

In the most devastating era of U.S. Indian policy, the
assimilation/allotment era, the pendulum swung to social experimentation
on Indian children who were placed in mandatory government boarding
schools, the dividing up of the reserved land base in violation of treaties,
and the appointment and establishment by the United States of Indian
agents on reservations who exercised complete control. 26 The U.S. Supreme
Court opined in several decisions throughout this era that the U.S. Congress
exercised “plenary”—or absolute—authority over tribal peoples and
governments. 27 The basis for this assertion was justified by the rationale that
the differences between European norms and American Indian norms set
up a civilization hierarchy with Europeans “superior” to American Indians. 28
It is during this time period that the federal agency charged with
implementing U.S. Indian law and policy, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, first authorized the
implementation of the Courts of Indian Offenses. 29
While U.S. Indian agents were exercising judicial power, some
Tribal Nations adapted traditional dispute resolution processes to conform
to the Euro-American style of formal court systems. In the 1820s, the
Cherokee Nation established written tribal laws, a tribal constitution, and
tribal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over the tribal territory. 30 By 1898,
the United States terminated the Cherokee Nation government, as well as
the other governments known as the Five Civilized Tribes (Cherokee,
Chickasaw, Choctaw, Muscogee (Creek), and Seminole tribal governments),
during the assimilation period of Indian policy. 31
26
27

See Indian General Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 49-105, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) [repealed].
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) (“The power of the general

government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else; because
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States; because it has
never been denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”); see also
Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over tribal relations
has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed
a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”).
See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823) (“But the tribes of Indians inhabiting
this country were fierce savages whose occupation was war and whose subsistence was drawn
chiefly from the forest.”).
See Gloria Valencia Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV.
225, 232–37 (1994).
LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION: ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL AT
DIFFERENT PERIODS 11-12 (1852), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/american-indianconsts/PDF/28014183.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8QW-CAVT].
See Act of June 28, 1898, Curtis Act, Pub. L. No. 55-517, 30 Stat. 495 (1899).
28

29

30

31
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In his 1882 annual report, U.S. Indian Commissioner, Hiram
Price, advocated for Christian missionaries, as teachers, to civilize American
Indians in the mandatory schools operated by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. 32 The next year, in his November 1, 1883, annual report,
Commissioner Price expressed his feelings against all forms of Indian
cultural practices as follows, “[e]very man familiar with Indian life will bear
witness to the pernicious influence of these savage rites and heathenish
customs.” 33 He was particularly vehement about targeting medicine men in
tribal communities. 34
In response, the Secretary of the Interior, Henry Teller, established
the Courts of Indian Offenses through Bureau regulations issued on
September 22, 1884, and approved a companion legal code. 35 As a civilizing
influence, the U.S. Indian agent was empowered to select tribal police
officers to form three-judge panels to determine sentences with appeals to
the BIA. 36
The companion legal code, the Code of Indian Offenses, outlawed
the spiritual and religious practices of American Indians, punished
medicine men, punished parents who resisted their children being taken to
boarding schools, and allowed total control by the U.S. Indian agent on
reservations backed by military forts at nearby locations. The Code
provided as the fourth rule:
4th. The “sun-dance,” the “scalp-dance,” the “war-dance,”
and all other so-called feasts assimilating thereto, shall be
considered “Indian offenses,” and any Indian found guilty
of being a participant in any one or more of these
“offenses” shall, for the first offense committed, be
punished by withholding from the person or persons so
found guilty by the court his or their rations for a period
not exceeding ten days; and if found guilty of any
subsequent offense under this rule, shall by punished by
withholding his or their rations for a period not less than
fifteen days, nor more than thirty days, or by incarceration
in the agency prison for a period not exceeding thirty days. 37
Francis Paul Prucha, Extract from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs October 10, 1882, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY 156 (Univ.

32

of Neb. Press 3rd ed. 2000).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
THEODORE HAAS, THE INDIAN AND THE LAW-1 6 (1949).

33
34
35

Id.
See Code of Indian Offenses, OFFICE OF ROBERT N. CLINTON, http://robertclinton.com/?page_id=289 [https://perma.cc/W8UL-4ZR7]; see also, U.S. OFF. OF INDIAN

36
37

AFF., SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, REGUL. OF THE INDIAN DEP’T 89 (The Indian Bureau 1884).
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Asserting full federal authority, the U.S. Indian agent could punish
“offenders” by withholding their food rations. 38 Further, the sixth rule of the
Code provided severe punishment for medicine men.
6th. The usual practices of so-called “medicine-men” shall
be considered “Indian offenses” cognizable by the Court
of Indian Offenses, and whenever it shall be proven to the
satisfaction of the court that the influence or practice of a
so-called “medicine-man” operates as a hindrance to the
civilization of a tribe, or that said “medicine-man” resorts
to any artifice or device to keep the Indians under his
influence, or shall adopt any means to prevent the
attendance of children at the agency schools, or shall use
any of the arts of a conjurer to prevent the Indians from
abandoning their heathenish rites and customs, he shall be
adjudged guilty of an Indian offense, and upon conviction
of any one or more of these specified practices, or, any
other, in the opinion of the court, of an equally antiprogressive nature, shall be confined in the agency prison
for a term not less than ten days, or until such time as he
shall produce evidence satisfactory to the court, and
approved by the agent, that he will forever abandon all
practices styled Indian offenses under this rule. 39
In the United States, a country with a constitutional provision guaranteeing
freedom of religion, 40 the BIA, under the executive branch, enforced legal
rules to indefinitely incarcerate practitioners of tribal spiritualities or until
the medicine men “forever abandon all practices styled Indian offenses,”
such as tribal ceremonies. 41 Further, the Code detailed that the courts would
have the same civil jurisdiction as a justice of the peace in the surrounding
state or territory. 42
Although named courts, the Courts of Indian Offenses were under
the executive branch and did not resemble federal or territorial courts
during the contemporaneous period. Rather, they operated as
instrumentalities of the assimilation policy. According to the primary federal
decision regarding the courts, their creation was justified as authorized by a

U.S. OFF. OF INDIAN AFF., SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, REGUL. OF THE INDIAN DEP’T 89 (The
Indian Bureau 1884).
Id. at 89–90.
See U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
U.S. OFF. OF INDIAN AFF., SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, REGUL. OF THE INDIAN DEP’T 89–90
(The Indian Bureau 1884).
See Code of Indian Offenses, supra note 37.

38

39
40
41

42
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treaty entered into with the Umatilla Indians, as follows in the United States
v. Clapox 43 decision:
By this treaty the Umatilla Indians engaged to submit to
any rule that might be prescribed by the United States for
their government. This obviously includes the power to
organize and maintain this Indian court and police, and to
specify the acts or conduct concerning which it shall have
jurisdiction. This treaty is an “act” or law “relating to Indian
affairs,” – the affairs of these Indians, and by said section
465 44 the power to prescribe a rule for carrying the same
into effect is given to the president, who has exercised the
same in this case through the proper instrumentality, - the
secretary of the interior. 45
This interpretation of a bilateral treaty as allowing one government the
authority to enact and enforce any rule against the other government is in
contradiction to the purpose of entering a treaty. This type of revisionist
interpretation to provide absolute authority over American Indians was a
hallmark of the assimilation period. The Court in Clapox further stated that
the purpose of these forums was unlike the generally understood function
of courts in the United States. 46 The language used to state that conclusion
is demeaning to American Indians and undermined the credibility of these
forums as legitimate, legal courts. The Court stated:
These “[C]ourts of Indian [O]ffenses” are not the
constitutional courts provided for in section 1, art. 3,
Const., which [C]ongress only has the power to “ordain
and establish,” but mere educational and disciplinary
instrumentalities, by which the government of the United
States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition
of these dependent tribes to whom it sustains the relation
of guardian. In fact, the reservation itself is in the nature of
a school, and the Indians are gathered there, under the
charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits,
ideas, and aspirations which distinguish the civilized from
the uncivilized man. 47

United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
Regulations by President, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, P.L. 116-179, 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2020)
(“The President may prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect
the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the settlement of the
accounts of Indian affairs.”).
Clapox, 35 F. at 577.

43
44

45
46
47

See id.
Id.
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The challenge to the authority of the Court of Indian Offenses on the
Umatilla Reservation originated in the arrest and jailing of an Indian woman
for alleged adultery, followed by several men forcibly releasing her from the
jail. Not only did the court fail to find a statutory basis for the adultery
conviction which it upheld, but the court also stated that the Umatilla
woman had committed a crime against the United States to uphold the
conviction. 48
Throughout the years, similar rulings by federal courts have led
to distrust and skepticism of courts’ abilities to deliver justice for American
Indians engaged in federal and state court proceedings. Bending the law to
assert authority over American Indians through convoluting and demeaning
rationales has often been the norm in federal Indian law decisions.
The Code of Indian Offenses was revised in 1892 under the
direction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas J. Morgan, to
ameliorate some of the issues in the original set of rules. For example, a
process for one-year terms for tribal judges sitting in district courts was set
forth, with appeals taken to a full panel of all the judges on the reservation. 49
Also, rather than indefinite incarceration, medicine men faced a sentence
of between ten to thirty days for the first offense, and subsequent convictions
carried a maximum sentence of up to six months. 50 The revisions
incorporated misdemeanors from the surrounding state or territories and
called for similar sentencing. 51 The revisions also included a provision on
the courts solemnizing marriages, although American Indians performed
marriage ceremonies according to traditional customs since time
immemorial. 52
The question of the authority to establish the Courts of Indian
Offenses seems to be answered by the colonial mentality of asserting
dominance over American Indians based on notions of racial and cultural
superiority. The legal machinations used to justify imposing these types of
courts outlawing the cultural and spiritual practices of Indigenous
populations contradicts the constitutional principles of freedom of religion
and basic rights of human existence.
III.

48
49
50
51
52

TRANSITION TO INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT
AND MODERN TRIBAL COURTS

Id. at 578–79.
Prucha, supra note 32, at 185.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id. at 186–87.
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The passage of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act heralded an
end to the worst aspects of the assimilation/allotment era. 53 The first section
of the law halted the allotment policy of parceling out the reserved lands of
Tribal Nations. 54 Another section authorized the adoption of tribal
constitutions and delineated the powers of tribal governments. 55 The BIA
developed boilerplate tribal constitutions based on club associations with
bylaws as available for adoption by tribal governments. 56 The tribal
constitutions did not create the counterbalance of three branches of
government similar to the U.S. governmental system. Rather, the
governmental power resided in one body, the Tribal Council, as the
executive and legislative authority, with oversight of the judicial power.
Even with this less than ideal governance structure, the provisions
of the IRA signaled a return to self-government for Tribal Nations and the
relaxing of the grip of federal authority by U.S. Indian agents in tribal
communities. Tribal peoples existed for thousands of years prior to the
formation of the United States and governed their own societies with laws
and dispute resolution processes across the Western Hemisphere. 57 The
shift in U.S. policy from military control to the recognition of tribal authority
to self-govern was heartily embraced by Tribal Nations.

A.

The Operation of Tribal Courts

Under the policy of Indian self-government, a majority of Tribal
Nations re-established tribal dispute resolution or court systems that provide
law and order functions, decision-making for civil matters, and the handling
of family law cases. 58 Customary or traditional law may be employed in tribal
judicial opinions alongside tribal statutes and other legal sources. 59
With a majority of tribal governments adopting the BIA-approved
constitutional models, Tribal Nations saw a return to former authority and
autonomy, away from the U.S. Indian agent system. 60 These self-government
era tribal courts replaced the former Courts of Indian Offenses and have
the authorization of inherent tribal sovereignty legitimizing the forums. 61
53
54
55
56
57

25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5144.

Id. § 5101.
Id. § 5123.
See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 69.
See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (recognizing that the Cherokee Nation and

all tribal governments existed prior to the U.S. Constitution and that tribal law governs
criminal law process in tribal court proceedings).
See generally Tribal Court Clearinghouse, TRIBAL LAW AND POL’Y INST.,
https://www.tribal-institute.org/ [https://perma.cc/3WFR-ZVTV].
See generally MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW (2011).
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.04[3][a][i], at 256–58.
Id. § 4.04[3][c][iv][B], at 265.
58

59
60
61
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Tribal court systems handle both civil and criminal cases for matters
impacting the tribal citizenry and government. Tribal courts review Tribal
Council actions for conformity with the relevant tribal constitutions, resolve
disputes in the commercial realm, and provide remedies in the area of tort
law. 62
Tribal Nations rejecting the boilerplate constitutions had similar
opportunities to benefit from the Indian Reorganization Act and assert tribal
governmental powers under both the federal law and the re-assertion of
tribal sovereignty. The Navajo Nation has not adopted a tribal constitution
and operates one of the most well-known tribal court systems in the world.
One of the most celebrated aspects of the Navajo Nation’s justice system is
the reinvigoration of the peacemaking process as an alternative to formal
dispute adjudication in tribal district courts. Thus, the Peacemaker Courts
represent Indigenous legal principles carried forward into contemporary
times to promote cultural norms, lessons, laws, and practices of the Navajo
peoples. 63
For various reasons, a small number of tribal governments have
continued to use the Courts of Indian Offenses models, now commonly
referred to as “C.F.R. Courts,” due to the application of the Code of Federal
Regulations as the governing law. 64 Unlike tribal courts, the C.F.R. Courts
operate under the authority of the BIA and are circumscribed by the federal
regulations on civil and criminal jurisdiction. 65 Some commentators criticize
the continued use of C.F.R. Courts as inhibiting the development of tribal
law and application of customary law. 66 For those tribal governments unable
to devote financial resources to a judicial branch, C.F.R. Courts have the
advantage of BIA funding. 67
Finally, tribal governments rejecting the three models of court
systems described above can retain judicial authority in the Tribal Council.
The entanglement between politics and judicial neutrality does not make
this a best practice in tribal communities. As sovereign entities within
territorial boundaries over domestic affairs, Tribal Nations have choices in
the structuring of court systems and dispute resolution practices.

JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL
STUDIES 122–33 (2016).
See Hon. Robert Yazzie, “Hozho Nahasdalii” –We Are Now in Good Relations: Navajo
Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117, 120–24 (1996).
See Court of Indian Offenses, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR: INDIAN AFFS.,
https://www.bia.gov/regional-offices/southern-plains/court-indian-offenses
[https://perma.cc/GV8Y-U639].
See 25 C.F.R. Part 11.
See Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis,
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 489–90 (2002).
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.04[3][c][B], at 267.
62
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65
66
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Tribal Appellate Courts

Tribal governments have options in creating the appellate process
of tribal courts. The first option enables a tribal government to form an
appellate court under its own laws. There are many of these appellate
courts, such as the Mashantucket Pequot Court of Appeals, the Seminole
Tribe of Florida Appellate Court, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Supreme Court,
and the Court of Appeals of the Shakopee Mdewakanton. An appeal of a
Navajo Nation district court decision goes to the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court, and the Cherokee Nation district court decisions are likewise
appealable to the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court. 68
Another option is for a tribal government to enter into a regional
appellate court system. Usually, this will require a formal resolution from
each tribal government’s Tribal Council accompanied by a fee-sharing
agreement to participate. Some examples of these appellate consortiums
include the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals, the Northwest
Intertribal Court System, Northern California Tribal Court Coalition, the
Intertribal Court of California, and the Southwest Intertribal Court of
Appeals. 69
The Tribal Council, exercising discretionary authority to hear
appeals from the tribal district court(s), may also retain jurisdiction over the
appellate process. 70 This is not a best practice due to the possible
entanglement of political issues with the role of neutral decision-maker. The
right of appeal is recognized across the spectrum of appellate court fora for
tribal jurisdictions and contemplated by tribal government in mandating the
appropriate appeal process. 71

C.

Tribal Court Jurisdiction: Criminal and Civil

The criminal and civil jurisdiction of tribal courts is set forth in
the tribal laws establishing the court systems. 72 For most governments, their
court systems assert jurisdiction over claims arising from conduct within the
government’s territory. For example, the government of Greece may apply
its laws to the full extent throughout its territorial boundaries, and the Greek
courts may resolve any and all criminal and civil cases arising within those
same boundaries. In contrast, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Supreme
Court have both sought to restrict the full extent of tribal governmental
CHEROKEE CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 7.
See About, NW. INTERTRIBAL CT. SYS., https://www.nics.ws/about.html
[https://perma.cc/CE8R-B5RL]. See also SWITCA Rep., AM. INDIAN LAW CTR., INC.,
https://www.ailc-inc.org/our-work/switca/
[https://perma.cc/WYW4-EY9G];
EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 72–3.
See generally Tribal Court Clearinghouse, supra note 58.
See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 72–3.
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.04[3][c].
68
69

70
71
72
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authority within the tribal territory. These issues are further discussed
below.

1.

Criminal Jurisdiction

The starting point for tribal court jurisdiction is the criminal realm
because this is the area first intruded upon by federal law—displacing
exclusive tribal governmental authority. In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Ex parte Crow Dog held that criminal activity involving two tribal
citizens was not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 73 Rather, legallybinding treaties retained criminal jurisdiction for tribal governments. 74
Responding to the outcry of public interest associations and lobbying by the
BIA, the U.S. Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act in 1885 to assert
federal criminal jurisdiction for enumerated crimes that were considered
felonies within Indian reservations and lands when allegedly committed by
an Indian person. 75 Formally, the law applied to “Indian country” as defined
in the federal criminal code. 76
As federal laws were enacted in the criminal jurisdiction realm over
Native Americans, a complicated scheme was put in place, which has been
critically referred to as a criminal jurisdiction maze. U.S. Supreme Court
rulings and federal laws have led to the following outcome: crimes
committed by an alleged Indian perpetrator in Indian country can be
concurrently charged in both tribal and federal courts; 77 crimes committed
by an alleged non-Indian perpetrator in Indian country with an Indian victim
can be charged federally, but not tribally; 78 and crimes committed by an
alleged non-Indian perpetrator in Indian country with a non-Indian victim
can be charged by state authorities. 79
Further, during the termination era of U.S. Indian policy, the
federal government, under Public Law 280, delegated criminal authority in
Indian country to six mandatory states and allowed other states to opt-in. 80
Those states receiving federal delegations share concurrent criminal
authority with tribal courts over alleged Indian perpetrators and are
responsible for charging non-Indians in Indian country regardless of the
status of the victim.
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

109 U.S. 556 (1883).

Id. at 572.

18 U.S.C. § 1153.

Id. § 1151.
See U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
See generally U.S. v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (holding that states have exclusive

jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes against other non-Indians in Indian
country).
18 U.S.C. § 1162.

80
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To further complicate matters, Congress enacted the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), severely restraining the criminal sentencing
authority of tribal courts. 81 Tribal courts face limitations when exercising
criminal jurisdiction. For example, tribal courts can only impose up to a
one-year incarceration and/or a fine of up to $5,000 per criminal count,
including the most serious felony-level crimes. 82 After public attention was
drawn to the lack of federal and state prosecutions and growing criminal
activity in Indian country, 83 the 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA)
was passed and incorporated into the ICRA with mixed reactions. 84 Under
the TLOA, certain requirements for tribal courts were set forth, tied to
increased criminal sentencing by imposing up to three years of incarceration
and/or a fine of $15,000 per count. 85 However, tribal courts were pressured
into adhering to state and federal procedures in criminal prosecutions,
resulting in trials that carried costly price tags with no additional funding. 86
Another feature of the TLOA was to allow tribal governments to
initiate retrocession of state criminal jurisdiction granted under Public Law
280 and return federal criminal jurisdiction as concurrent in tribal
territories. 87 Prior to the 2010 provision, only state governments had the
authority to petition for retrocession of criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country. A handful of tribal governments have successfully utilized this
provision. Pursuant to land claims settlements and specific statutes involving
state criminal jurisdiction, federal laws have often contained language
providing state criminal, and sometimes civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, for
cases involving reservation Indians over the designated tribal territory and
should be researched per tribal government to determine proper
jurisdiction. 88
With the limitations on tribal court sentencing, Native American
communities must rely on federal and state law enforcement to devote
attention, time, and resources to keeping women, children, and all members
of the community safe. Unfortunately, this reliance has been a dismal
81
82
83

25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304.

Id. § 1302(a)(7)(B).
See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L USA, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO

PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA
(2007), https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeofinjustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVZ8W65Y] (noting the pervasive sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native
women in the United States).
See Jasmine Owens, “Historic” in A Bad Way: How the Tribal Law and Order Act

84

Continues the American Tradition of Providing Inadequate Protection to American Indian
and Alaska Native Rape Victims, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 518–21 (2012).
85
86
87
88

25 U.S.C. § 1302(b).

See EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 49–50.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(d).
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4 § 6.04[4], at 578–83.
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failure. The passage of the Violence against Women Act in 2013 was an
imperfect fix that allowed for the prosecution of special domestic violence
offenses in tribal courts where the alleged perpetrator is a non-Indian and
the victim is an Indian in Indian country. 89 The special jurisdiction requires
congressional renewal—placing the prosecutorial authority subject to
political uncertainties.

2.

Civil Jurisdiction

The civil jurisdiction of tribal courts is set forth in tribal law as
extending throughout the tribal territory. Tribal governments have
established courts as forums for any type of civil action based on legislative
authority, whether involving commercial disputes, domestic issues, personal
injury actions, or governmental administrative matters, to name a few areas.
In general, tribal courts follow civil procedure requirements for adjudicative
authority based on the federal rules of civil procedure with more emphasis
on due process rights than on enforcing strict adherence to procedural
standards.
The National Indian Law Library is an online resource that allows
for the review of tribal court civil action decisions by examining the reported
decisions in the Indian Law Reporter. 90 The National Indian Law Library
index has thirty categories for researching tribal court decisions on various
topics, including areas from agriculture to cyberspace and employment law
to wills and trusts. 91 Through a monthly review of tribal court decisions, an
Indian law bulletin is accessible on this website and searchable by topic for
new developments in tribal law. 92 A selection of tribal court decisions may
also be available through mainstream legal research services. The best
source of legal decisions will be locally through contacting the relevant tribal
court clerk(s) for precedential decisions and access to tribal court archives.

3.

Public Law 280 and Impacts to Tribal Courts

As discussed above, the enactment of Public Law 280 during the
termination era of U.S. Indian policy has impacted the operation of tribal
courts. Under Public Law 280, specific states received federal delegations
of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Under the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968, states opting for the federal delegation of criminal jurisdiction had

89

25 U.S.C. § 1304.

See Indian Law Reporter: Tribal Court Cases Index, NAT’L INDIAN LAW LIBR. (Mar. 18,
2015), https://www.narf.org/nill/ilr/ [https://perma.cc/74UV-UYK8].

90

91
92

Id.
Indian Law Bulletins: Tribal Courts, NAT’L INDIAN LAW LIBR. (Dec. 18, 2019),

https://www.narf.org/nill/bulletins/tribal/2019.html [https://perma.cc/7QAX-WUHL].
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to obtain tribal consent, and no tribal government provided such approval. 93
With the state exercise of criminal jurisdiction, some tribal governments did
not authorize tribal courts to exercise any form of concurrent criminal
jurisdiction due to a lack of federal funding. 94 Rather, the tribal courts were
exclusively authorized as courts of civil jurisdiction.
Another aspect of the enactment of Public Law 280 was to open
the state courts as alternative forums for civil actions involving Indians that
arise in tribal territories. This civil law component of Public Law 280 is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 and was initially enacted to apply in the states
of Alaska, California, Minnesota (except on the Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs
Reservation), and Wisconsin. 95 The nine states currently operating with
optional Public Law 280 jurisdiction are: Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and Washington. 96 Civil actions
filed in state court must involve at least one Indian party under this federal
grant of authority for an action arising within a tribal territory.
Two U.S. Supreme Court cases have interpreted the civil aspects of
Public Law 280 and developed the criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory
test to determine state authority. In Bryan v. Itasca County, 97 a case arising
in the Public Law 280 mandatory state of Minnesota, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the state’s asserted taxing authority within the Leech Lake
25 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1); see EAGLEWOMAN & LEEDS, supra note 9, at 21 (“This extension
of state jurisdiction over tribal communities did not require tribal consent until 1968. Due to
the often strained relationships between state government and tribal governments, the
delegation to state authority was often unwelcome from the tribal perspective.”).
See, e.g., Jerry Gardner & Ada Pecos Melton, Public Law 280: Issues and Concerns for
Victims of Crime in Indian Country, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribalinstitute.org/articles/gardner1.htm#12 [https://perma.cc/EX8U-U9R6].
The federal government, however, viewed Public Law 280 as a license
to drop financial and technical support for tribal self-government and
tribal governmental institutions in the Public Law 280 states. The
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) used it as an excuse for redirecting
federal support on a wholesale basis away from Indian Nations in the
‘Public Law 280 states’ and towards all other Indian Nations. The most
striking illustration of this redirected federal support concerns the
funding of tribal law enforcement and tribal courts. In many Public Law
280 states, the BIA refused to support tribal law enforcement and tribal
courts on the grounds that Public Law 280 made tribal criminal
jurisdiction unnecessary.
93

94

Id.

28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
See Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Research Priorities: Law Enforcement
in Public Law 280 States, 2 n.4 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209926.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7RH-AZRM] (noting that North Dakota required tribal consent to assert
jurisdiction but has not gained that consent).
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
95
96

97
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Reservation as unauthorized under the statute. 98 Further, the Court opined
that state regulatory authority, such as taxing or imposing state law within
Indian country, was not granted in the civil sections of the law. 99 Such a grant
of authority would undermine tribal governmental authority, which was not
supported in the legislative history or actual wording of the statute. 100 In
parsing the statute, the Court applied the Indian canon of construction for
treaties, statutes, and regulations enacted for the benefit of Indians as
requiring that ambiguous provisions “are to be liberally construed, doubtful
expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.” 101 Because the taxing
conduct fell within the civil/regulatory sphere of governmental authority, the
civil provisions of Public Law 280 did not empower states to override tribal
governmental authority.
Likewise, in the U.S. Supreme Court decision, California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 102 the mandatory Public Law 280 state of
California asserted authority to shut down a tribal bingo business. 103 The
Court considered whether the state regulated similar gambling activities or
criminally prohibited such activities. 104 In determining that Public Law 280
jurisdiction only authorized application of criminal law in tribal territories,
the Court held that application of the criminal/prohibitory and
civil/regulatory test nullified the state’s argument that it could assert control
over tribal bingo operations as the state regulated comparable gambling
activity. 105 Therefore, these two decisions cabin the civil aspect of Public Law
280 to providing state court forums for private civil actions involving an
Indian party.
The practical result of the civil provisions of Public Law 280 in the
relevant states is to allow a race to the courthouse for litigants when a private
cause of action arises in Indian country involving an Indian party. 106 Some
tribal governments and states have codified comity principles, others have
followed such principles through court decisions, and still, others have not
addressed the issue to date. 107 In Public Law 280 states, there is concurrent
subject matter jurisdiction for state and tribal courts for private civil actions,
except for suits involving the tribal government or its entities as exempted
by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. 108
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 388–89.
Id.
Id. at 392.

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).

Id. at 207.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211–12.

COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 6.04[3][c], at 558.
See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A
Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 336–45 (2000).
See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 785 (2014).
106
107
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By allowing civil actions involving Indians as private persons that
arise in tribal territories to be heard in either state or tribal court, the exercise
of state court jurisdiction may be viewed as undermining the activity of tribal
courts. Legal jurisprudence is developed by the consideration of issues over
time with judicial decisions building on rationales and strengthening bodies
of interpretative law. For tribal courts, the incursions allowed by state forums
hearing civil cases could work as a detriment to the development of tribal
judicial interpretation of tribal law for civil causes of action.

D. Customary/Traditional Law in Tribal Courts
Tribal Nations are pre-constitutional and indigenous to North
America. Within these societies, dispute resolution processes were
developed and followed to maintain harmony and balance for social
functioning. Customary legal principles and norms have been taught
through generations based on accounts and stories expressing both socially
acceptable behaviors and the disapproval of unacceptable behaviors. Thus,
children received this behavioral training early on to shape their
understanding of proper ethical, legal, and social standards. In
contemporary tribal courts, judges may take judicial notice of customary
legal principles, receive expert testimony from qualified cultural knowledge
holders, or follow precedent in decisions detailing the appropriate
customary law for that particular tribal society. Court decisions and
customary legal principles compose the common law of tribal courts.
One of the most prominent traditional customary law practices is
found in the Navajo Nation Peacemaker Court and program, which has
been the subject of study by legal scholars throughout the world. 109 In
explaining the concept of horizontal justice in the Navajo mindset, Chief
Justice Emeritus Robert Yazzie distinguishes the Anglo view of vertical
justice as the adversarial system with judges as decision-makers through
power over the parties. 110
Navajo justice is a sophisticated system of egalitarian
relationships where group solidarity takes the place of force
and coercion. In it, humans are not in ranks or status
classifications from top to bottom. Instead, all humans are
equals and make decisions as a group. The process – which
we call “peacemaking” in English – is a system of
Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts: A Navajo Jurist’s Perspective,
in NAVAJO NATION PEACEMAKING: LIVING TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 31
109

(Marianne O. Nielsen & James V. Zion, eds., 2005).
Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, in NAVAJO NATION
PEACEMAKING: LIVING TRADITIONAL JUSTICE, 43–47 (Marianne O. Nielsen & James W.
Zion eds., 2005).
110
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relationships where there is no need for force, coercion or
control. There are no plaintiffs or defendants; no “good
guy” or “bad guy.” These labels are irrelevant. “Equal
justice” and “equality before the law” mean precisely what
they say. As Navajos, we do not think of equality as treating
people equal before the law; they are equal in it. Again our
Navajo language points this out in practical terms. 111
Cases are initiated in Peacemaker Court by the parties to the dispute or
through referrals by courts, government agencies, or schools. 112 Participating
in the peacemaking program is always voluntary. 113 Once the case is filed, a
well-respected community peacemaker is assigned; the peacemaker is
responsible for gathering interested individuals to facilitate the ceremonial
stages of the process. 114 Components of the resolution process include
prayers, every person contributing to both speaking and listening, the ability
of family members to respond to excuses, teachings by the peacemaker
appropriate to the situation, and a closing with a meal. 115
Tribal governments may codify traditional law, incorporate
specific legal processes, or acknowledge adversarial proceedings as
applicable law in modern tribal courts. For example, there has been a
proliferation of Tribal Healing to Wellness Courts, providing culturally
appropriate guidance for those entering the criminal justice system due to
substance abuse or mental health issues. 116 Other examples include court
processes involving juveniles, such as the Red Lake Band of Chippewa in
Minnesota establishing the Abinoojiyag Noojimoo-wigamig or Children’s
Healing Center, with the mission statement to “[r]ealize a 20% reduction in
juvenile delinquency and juvenile recidivism during the next five years by
implementing a holistic comprehensive strategic plan.” 117 Thus by drawing
upon cultural principles, custom, and traditional legal concepts, tribal courts
working within tribal communities are reinvigorating the values and
standards that provide tribal cohesion.

111

Id. at 47.
See Navajo Nation Peacemaking Program, TRIBAL ACCESS

TO JUSTICE INNOVATION,
http://www.tribaljustice.org/places/traditional-practices/navajo-nation-peacemakingprogram/ [https://perma.cc/EF9G-GMZQ].
112

113
114

Id.
See id.

James Zion, The Dynamics of Navajo Peacemaking: Social Psychology of an American
Indian Method of Dispute Resolution, in NAVAJO NATION PEACEMAKING: LIVING
115

TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 91–96 (Marianne O. Nielson & James W. Zion eds., 2005).
TRIBAL
HEALING
TO
WELLNESS
COURTS,
http://wellnesscourts.org/
[https://perma.cc/C3KK-S54D].
The Children’s Healing Center, RED LAKE NATION, https://www.redlakenation.org/thechildrens-healing-center/ [https://perma.cc/AYD5-NR65].
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U.S. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE
CIVIL JURISDICTION OF TRIBAL COURTS

Tribal Nations have been labeled the third sovereign in the
United States along with the federal and state governments. 118 However,
tribal governments do not neatly fit within the U.S. constitutional
framework. This section notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has
inconsistently respected the sovereignty of Tribal Nations. Moreover, the
Court has inconsistently followed the current overarching U.S. Indian policy
of self-determination since the late 1960s in terms of supporting tribal
legislative and adjudicatory authority within tribal territories. As discussed
in the section on criminal jurisdiction, the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts
has been subject to narrowing by U.S. Supreme Court decisions based on
whether the defendant is a non-Indian or a non-member and whether the
cause of action is based on federal law. Each of these lines of federal judicial
limitations will be discussed in turn.
One of the lasting legacies of the assimilation/allotment era of U.S.
Indian policy in the late 1800s through the early 1900s was the allotment of
the reserved homelands of Tribal Nations under the 1887 General
Allotment Act. 119 This law allowed the U.S. President to declare a
reservation open for allotment. Once declared, the local U.S. Indian agent
was empowered to assign to individuals and/or heads of households lots of
the reservation lands ranging in size from eighty to one-hundred and sixty
acres. 120 Following the allotment process, the U.S. Indian agent declared the
remaining reservation lands as “surplus,” with the U.S. Congress setting the
price the U.S. would pay for the surplus. 121 Once within the ownership of
the United States, the U.S. President could set land aside for national parks
or sell it to individual settlers within the reservation boundaries. 122 By

See generally Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal
Courts Remarks, 33 TULSA L. REV. 1 (1997) (referring to Tribal Nations as the third

118

sovereign).
Law of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (repealed 1934); see also PRUCHA, supra note
32, at 170–73.
PRUCHA, supra note 32, at 170.
See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 13–14 (1995)
(explaining that after the 1903 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lonewolf v. Hitchcock
announcing that Congress was not required to obtain tribal consent for Indian affairs multiple
federal surplus land acts diminished the reservation land bases).
See Angelique EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide for
119

120
121

122

American Indians and Alaska Natives in the United States: The Call to Recognize Full
Human Rights as Set Forth in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 3 AMER. IND. L.J. 424, 437 (2015) (“In reality, this was an illegal, unconsented to
land grab from the Tribal Nations, and then a reappropriating of those lands owned by tribal
peoples to the ownership of the United States on a might makes right basis.”).
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implementing this law, the treaties reserving homelands for American
Indians were forever violated by the United States.
Reservation lands allotted to tribal peoples were held in trust status
by the United States government and were acknowledged as within the tribal
jurisdiction. Fee lands are parcels that private parties purchased on a
reservation or within a tribal community boundary. Today, fee lands, and
the jurisdiction of the fee lands, remain complicated based on the type of
jurisdiction asserted. Thus, the labeling of jurisdiction on reservations as a
“crazy quilt” of tribal, federal, and state jurisdiction. 123 The reasons for this
labeling will become more apparent following the discussion below.

A.

The Montana Test for Jurisdiction over Non-Indians or NonMembers on Fee Lands

The 1981 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Montana v. United
States dealt with an enactment by the Crow Tribal Council to prevent non124

Indians from engaging in hunting within the reservation boundaries. 125 The
state of Montana disputed the tribal authority and licensed hunting on fee
lands within the reservation. 126 First, the Court, relying on federal common
law circumscribing tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, applied the
same rationale to tribal civil jurisdiction. “Though Oliphant only
determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on
which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of
the tribe.” 127 Next, the Court set out a test for determining when a tribal
government had the power to exercise jurisdiction on fee lands within tribal
boundaries over non-members as follows:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens

See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV.
225, 234 (1994).
Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Id. at 549 ("Council has passed several resolutions respecting hunting and fishing on the
reservation, including Resolution No. 74-05, the occasion for this lawsuit. That resolution
prohibits hunting and fishing within the reservation by anyone who is not a member of the
Tribe.").
Id. at 548–49.
Id. at 565.
123

124
125

126
127
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or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. 128
Indian law scholars often refer to the two prongs of the test as the consensual
relations prong and the direct effects prong. Applying the test to the tribal
resolution, the Court opined that the tribal government lacked jurisdiction
to regulate hunting on fee lands by non-Indians within the reservation. 129

1.

The Abstention Doctrine for Federal Courts and Exhaustion of
Tribal Court Remedies

Following the Montana decision, several non-Indian civil
defendants invoked federal court authority seeking to override tribal court
adjudications. In National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 130 the defendants pursued an action in federal court to
enjoin a lawsuit proceeding in tribal court, which arose from an insurance
claim involving a negligence action when a youth was injured in a school
parking lot located on the reservation. 131 The U.S. Supreme Court applied
28 U.S.C. § 1331, the statute conferring federal question jurisdiction for “all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States,” and held that this included the common law developed by the Court
regarding tribal court jurisdiction. 132 Through this reasoning, the Court
upheld federal court jurisdiction to review whether a tribal court has
properly asserted its jurisdiction over non-member defendants in civil
actions. 133
This is a strained interpretation of federal subject matter jurisdiction
and ungrounded in U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2’s express “arising
under” language stating that “the judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .
. . .” 134 The decisions or common law of the U.S. Supreme Court is not
included in the list for federal question jurisdiction.
In addition, the Court articulated an abstention doctrine for federal
courts, requiring them to stay their decision until a civil defendant exhausts
tribal remedies—through every level of the tribal court system—prior to
making a federal determination on tribal jurisdiction. 135 “Exhaustion of tribal
court remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 566.

Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).

Id. at 847.
Id. at 850.
Id. at 851–53.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
471 U.S. at 857.
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parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide
other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event
of further judicial review.” 136
In a footnote, the Court detailed three exceptions to the
requirement of exhaustion of tribal court remedies. First, where the
assertion of tribal court jurisdiction stems from an intent to harass or is
conducted in bad faith; second, where the action is “patently violative of
express jurisdictional prohibitions;” or third, where exhaustion would be
futile as depriving a party of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s
jurisdiction. 137
The issue of federal court jurisdiction to review a tribal court
determination of its jurisdiction arose next in a federal diversity of
citizenship action. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Iowa Mutual Insurance
Company v. LaPlante 138 that federal suits brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332 under diversity jurisdiction also required abstention by federal courts
and exhaustion of tribal remedies. The initiation of the lawsuit in the
Blackfeet Tribal Court against the insurance company included a claim for
bad faith in failing to settle a personal injury claim; thus, the federal court
action was considered premature. 139 “In diversity cases, as well as federalquestion cases, unconditional access to the federal forum would place it in
direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter’s
authority over reservation affairs.” 140

2.

Judicially Created Limitations on the Extent of Tribal Court
Adjudicatory Authority

In the final case in this legal thread, the U.S. Supreme Court opined
in Strate v. A-1 Contractors 141 that tribal courts generally exercised
adjudicatory authority to the extent of their legislative authority, rather than
territorial authority. 142 Strate involved a highway accident within the
reservation where a gravel truck struck the vehicle of a widow, who was also
a mother of tribal members. 143 The gravel truck was on the reservation due
to a contract with a tribal governmental entity to complete landscaping

136
137
138
139
140

Id.
Id. at 856 n.21.

Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).

Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 16.

Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). Justice Ginsberg delivered the majority
opinion.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
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work. 144 First, the Court held that the Montana test applied and grounded
the assertion as follows:
As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.
Absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court
jurisdiction, we adhere to that understanding. Subject to
controlling provisions in treaties and statutes, and the two
exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of
Indian tribes and their courts with respect to non-Indian
fee lands generally “does not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe.” 145
Next, the Court categorized the area of highway where the accident occurred
as subject to a state right-of-way, to be fee land for the application of the
Montana prongs—consensual relations and direct effects. 146 In the decision,
the Court states, “[p]etitioners and the United States refer to no treaty or
statute authorizing the Three Affiliated Tribes to entertain highway-accident
tort suits.” 147 The fact that no treaty or statute was relied on should not be
surprising as personal injury claims arising out of automobile use were not
contemplated when the parties entered into treaties in the 1800s. In
reviewing the conduct of the gravel truck driver and his employer, the Court
held that neither the consensual relations nor the direct effects prong from
Montana allowed for tribal court jurisdiction over the vehicular collision. 148
Through these decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has
announced limitations previously unknown to tribal court authority and
sought to base its reasoning on the status of parcels of land within reservation
boundaries and circular ideas concerning federal question and diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution. By instituting a process
of federal court analysis of cases originating in tribal courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court has created disincentives for the filing of lawsuits in tribal
courts where the potential for the civil defendant to litigate through every
level of the tribal court system and then seek review of the tribal court’s
jurisdiction in federal court will be extremely costly and inefficient. In
addition, tribal courts are being viewed as administrative bodies, forced to
explain the grounds for tribal court jurisdiction for the benefit of a federal
court down the line that will conduct its own analysis. 149 This type of
subsuming tribal courts into federal judicial processes is ungrounded under
the U.S. Constitution and will be more fully discussed below.
Id.
Id. at 453 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
Id. at 454–56.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 456–59.
Phillip Allen White, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: “Just Stay on the Good Roads, and
You’ve Got Nothing to Worry About,” 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65, 117–19 (1997).
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U.S. Supreme Court’s Barring of Federal Claims in Tribal Courts

The primary U.S. Supreme Court decision on the filing of federal
civil claims in a tribal court forum is Nevada v. Hicks, arising from a tribal
citizen’s lawsuit against state officials claiming they unlawfully searched his
reservation home and harassed him based on suspicion of illegal hunting on
state lands. 150 Floyd Hicks brought claims in the Fallon-Paiute Shoshone
Tribal Court against state game wardens and the state of Nevada based on
trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including denial of equal protection, denial of due
process, and unreasonable search and seizure. 151 Both the Tribal Court and
Tribal Appellate Court upheld tribal jurisdiction over the claims. 152
The civil defendants then filed an action in federal district court
seeking a declaration that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction. 153 On
appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the reasoning in the Strate v. A1 Contractors case on limiting the tribal court’s authority to adjudicate
claims to its narrow interpretation of tribal legislative authority over
domestic tribal matters. 154 In other words, the Court found that the tribal
government did not have legislative authority to regulate the conduct of state
game wardens or the state of Nevada, and thus, the tribal court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims. 155
The Court reviewed Article III of the U.S. Constitution and held
that the “historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state court
jurisdiction over federal law cases is completely missing with respect to tribal
courts.” 156 Relying on the Strate decision, the Court posited that tribal courts
are not courts of general jurisdiction, but rather have limited adjudicatory
authority over non-members to the extent of tribal legislative authority. 157 In
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion, he stated that tribal law controls
whether tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction as there is no federal
law addressing the issue. 158

C.

The Flip Side: Enforcement of Tribal Orders by Federal Courts

The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have grappled with the
question of whether under U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2, there is
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 355–56 (2001).

Id. at 356–57.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 376–82.
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 7.02[1][a], at 599–600.
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 366–67.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 402–04.
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federal question subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a tribal court
judgment filed in a U.S. federal court. 159 In 2007, the Tenth Circuit held in
MacArthur v. San Juan County that a judgment granting relief, including
injunctive relief from a Navajo Nation district court, filed in federal court
for enforcement was a foreign judgment not entitled to full faith and credit. 160
As a foreign judgment, the Tenth Circuit applied the principles of comity to
determine whether the Navajo Nation district court had proper subject
matter jurisdiction over the non-member defendants. 161 Further, the Tenth
Circuit stated, “[t]he question of the regulatory and adjudicatory authority
of the tribes—a question bound up in the decision to enforce a tribal court
order—is a matter of federal law giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” 162
In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit reached a different result in
Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. Co. 163 A tribal court entered
a judgment for the Tribe in a contract dispute where both parties had agreed
to tribal court jurisdiction for dispute resolution. 164 When the defendant
construction company failed to satisfy the judgment, the Tribe brought suit
in federal court for enforcement. 165 The Eleventh Circuit held “the Tribe
has failed to explain the specific prescription of federal common law that
enables it to maintain an action to enforce a judgment handed down by a
tribal court in a proceeding to which the defendant consented.” 166 The court
distinguished the federal common law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions
where non-members challenged the tribal jurisdiction from the instant case
involving a signed contract. 167
In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit summarized the U.S. Supreme
Court’s reasoning in finding federal question jurisdiction to review tribal
court jurisdiction as follows: “[i]n sum, National Farmers dictates that a
dispute over tribal court jurisdiction is considered a dispute over tribal
sovereignty, and therefore—like a dispute over tribal sovereignty—is a matter
of federal law to which § 1331 applies.” 168 The idea that tribal sovereignty
presents a federal question seems to completely miss the point that

See MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 2007); Coeur d’Alene
Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019); Miccosukee Tribe v. Kraus-Anderson
Constr. Co., 607 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010).
497 F.3d at 1067 n.5.
Id. at 1066–69.
Id. at 1066.
Miccosukee Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1274.
Id. at 1270.
159
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Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1274–75.
Id. at 1275.
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sovereignty is governmental authority as determined by the government
asserting its sovereignty.
The Ninth Circuit in 2019 addressed the issue of enforcing a tribal
court judgment filed in federal court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks. 169
The case involved enforcement of a tribal law judgment against nonmembers for placing a boat garage and other installments on tribal lands,
ordering a civil fine, and authorizing the removal of the encroaching items. 170
The Ninth Circuit noted that the action did not involve any claim arising
under federal law, the U.S. Constitution, or a treaty of the United States, 171
but went on to find that tribal court jurisdiction had been limited by U.S.
Supreme Court decisions in federal common law. This limitation provided
a basis for a substantial question of federal law on whether the tribal court
had the authority to enter judgment against the non-members. 172
These decisions illustrate the circular reasoning created by the U.S.
Supreme Court’s announcement that tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over
non-members except in certain enumerated situations under the Montana
test. The overreach exhibited in relation to tribal court jurisdiction has made
it necessary for federal courts to engage in mental gymnastics to find subject
matter jurisdiction to preside over tribal enforcement actions against nonmembers.
V.

QUESTIONING THE LEGAL BASIS FOR FEDERAL COURT
REVIEW OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION

The first question to be raised in examining the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions limiting tribal court authority is by what authority does the
Court oversee tribal court jurisdiction. In Nevada v. Hicks, the Court
correctly noted that Article III in the U.S. Constitution does not mention
tribal governments or tribal courts. 173 The U.S. Constitution under Article 1,
Section 8 references tribal governments in relation to Congress: “[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with
the Indian Tribes.” 174 Tribal Nations are extra-constitutional and are not
bound or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Constitution. 175 The
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the Tribal Nations’ extraconstitutionality in the 1896 decision of Talton v. Mayes, holding that the
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Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks, 933 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019).

Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1055
Id. at 1056.

Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366–67 (2001).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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Fifth Amendment in the U.S. Bill of Rights is inapplicable to tribal
governments, as they existed prior to the Constitution. 176
In justifying the ability of federal courts to review tribal jurisdiction,
two federal statutes are used relating to the federal question statute: 28
U.S.C. § 1331 177 and 28 U.S.C. § 1362. 178 Both statutes center on the types
of claims brought into federal courts, and neither allows for the federal court
to consider the decisions of another court system, namely tribal courts. 179
The federal question statute does not authorize review of tribal
governmental authority or the jurisdiction of federal courts; 180 rather, it is the
enactment of the U.S. Constitution’s Article III provisions for federal court
jurisdiction. 181 In National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow
Tribe, the Court engaged in circular reasoning that since the Court’s
decisions have limited tribal jurisdiction, an analysis of federal common-law
is required to determine whether the tribal court is properly applying tribal
jurisdiction. 182
The question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to
compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil
jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered
by reference to federal law and is a “federal question”
under § 1331. Because petitioners contend that federal law
has divested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is
federal law on which they rely as a basis for the asserted
right of freedom from Tribal Court interference. They
have, therefore, filed an action “arising under” federal law
within the meaning of § 1331. The District Court correctly
concluded that a federal court may determine under §
1331 whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits
of its jurisdiction. 183
This reasoning completely fails to acknowledge that tribal governments exist
independently and existed prior to the U.S. government and the U.S.
judiciary. Tribal governmental laws defining the civil jurisdiction of tribal
courts are not derived from federal law and, thus, are not within the federal
Id. (“It follows that as the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation
existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated upon by the fifth amendment, which,
as we have said, had for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the constitution on
the national government.”).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1362.
28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948) State and Territorial statutes and judicial proceedings;
full faith and credit has not been interpreted to include Indian tribes.
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 852–53 (1985).
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question jurisdiction of the U.S. federal courts. 184 Similarly, tribal
governments are not diverse citizens and have sovereign immunity from suit
in federal forums. Thus, the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, conferring
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction on the federal courts, is also inapplicable
contrary to the holding in Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante. 185
The second statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1362, provides that federal courts
“have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or
band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior,
wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” 186 This federal law allows federal courts to hear
claims brought by tribal governments but does not provide for federal
review of cases originating in tribal courts. Rather, the statute clarifies the
federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to expressly include federal
question cases brought by tribal governments in federal courts.
The default justification for the U.S. Supreme Court in curtailing
tribal sovereign authority to adjudicate civil claims in tribal forums is the
judicially announced “plenary power” exercised by the U.S. Congress 187 and
the common-law authority exercised by the Court itself. 188 Neither of these
announced powers are authorized by the U.S. Constitution or consented to
by Tribal Nations. Indian law scholar, Robert Clinton, has aptly explained,
“there is no acceptable, historically-derived, textual constitutional
explanation for the exercise of any federal authority over Indian tribes
without their consent manifested through treaty. . . . [N]either Congress nor
the federal courts legitimately can unilaterally adopt binding legal principles
for the tribes without their consent.” 189
VI.

184

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TWO PATHS
FORWARD OR ONE STEP BACK?

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).

Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18–20 (1987).
28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018).
See U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) (“The power of the general government
over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must
exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of
its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”); see also, Lonewolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over tribal relations . . . has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”).
See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 852–53.
Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 113, 115–16 (2002).
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During the negotiations at the Treaty of Niagara in 1764, the two
rows wampum belt was exchanged, denoting parallel governments in
alliance: one row representing the British government and the other
representing Indigenous Nations. 190
The treaty at Niagara was entered into in July and August
of 1764, and was regarded as “the most widely
representative gathering of American Indians ever
assembled,” as approximately two thousand chiefs
attended the negotiations. There were over twenty-four
Nations gathered with “representative nations as far east as
Nova Scotia, and as far west as Mississippi, and as far north
as Hudson Bay.” It was also possible that representatives
from even further afield participated in the treaty as some
records indicate that the Cree and Lakota (Sioux) nations
were also present at this event. 191
As Chief Justice John Marshall asserted in Johnson v. M’Intosh, the United
States, as the successor government to Great Britain, entered into a
relationship with the Tribal Nations. 192 Thus, the two paths forward would
continue to allow tribal governments, through tribal court systems, to
provide dispute resolution in harmony with tribal values, laws, and ideals.
The United States, as an ally to Tribal Nations, would restrain impulses to
pressure tribal court systems to replicate Anglo-Saxon norms and laws.
Rather, as allies on shared lands, the federal and state court systems would
respect the legal processes of tribal courts. This may lead to consensual
agreements on the issues of adjudicatory authority and an adherence to
principles of comity and full faith and credit for tribal court decisions.

A.

Current Quagmire of Creating Common Law Doctrine through
“Plenary Power”

One step back is for the U.S. government and courts to continue to
coerce tribal courts into lesser and lesser authority and eventually seek to
subsume these courts in an act of returning to colonization. These
colonizing ideas of supplanting Indigenous legal systems with the
surrounding European-based systems crop up from time to time and would
swing the pendulum of U.S. Indian policy towards the negation of tribal
governance. The pseudo-anthropological spectrum of human evolution

John Borrows, Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History,
and Self-Government, ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW,
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EQUALITY, AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE, 155, 169 (Michael Esh, ed., 1997).
Id. at 170.
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584 (1823).
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with American Indians depicted on the “primitive” end of the spectrum is a
relic of a racist, colonizing past, and should be put to rest once and for all. 193
Through the circular reasoning of plenary authority, the federal
courts continue to overreach into tribal jurisdictions by crafting common
law doctrine ungrounded in legal authority. The U.S. judiciary is charged
with the authority to regulate governmental authority within the bounds of
the U.S. Constitution. The entire line of cases surrounding tribal civil
jurisdiction is outside those bounds and sets the course of the U.S. Supreme
Court on a legislative track, rather than its judicial function. 194
As discussed above, the difficulties emerging from this overreach
include further encroachments into whether tribal courts may entertain
federal claims, whether non-members have exhausted tribal remedies
before seeking federal court review of tribal jurisdiction, and whether tribal
court judgments based on tribal law are enforceable in federal courts
depending on the type of defendants involved. Further, a race-based nonIndian/non-member distinction runs counter to U.S. Constitutional
protections. Within this quagmire, tribal consent to U.S. Supreme Court
review of tribal jurisdiction is completely lacking. 195

B.

Recommendation for Tribal and U.S. Full Faith and Credit Treaty

As noted in the discussion throughout this article, the U.S. federal
courts have repeatedly identified the Tribal Nation courts as entering
foreign judgments but have also found federal question jurisdiction to review
whether Tribal Nation courts have proper adjudicatory authority over nonmembers. From this conflictual posture arises the need for a solution based
on the government-to-government relationship between Tribal Nations and
the United States of America. Within the U.S. Department of Justice, the
Office of Tribal Justice would be the proper starting point to conduct
consultations with Tribal Nations on consensual treaty agreements for full
An example of this type of discourse is found in American Indian Tribal Courts: The
Costs of Separate Justice by Samuel J. Brakel (1978). “The tribal courts do not work well,
and necessary improvements would require time and involve many difficulties. To
perpetuate them at all runs counter to the evolutionary trends in the Indians’ relation to the
dominant culture in this country.” SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS:
THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 103 (1978).
See Angelique EagleWoman, A Constitutional Crisis When the U.S. Supreme Court Acts
193

194

in a Legislative Manner? An Essay Offering a Perspective on Judicial Activism in Federal
Indian Law and Federal Civil Procedure Pleading Standards, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. PENN.

STATIM 41, 42 (2010) (“Scholars of federal Indian law have pondered how to curb the
highest court in the United States from running rampant over Tribal Nations when the court
creates new standards, principles and laws out of thin air.”).
See Matthew Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 45, 48 (2012)
(“Tribal consent to federal statutes, regulations, and cases that decide matters critical to
American Indian people and tribes long has been lacking.”).
195

374

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

faith and credit of judgments rendered by tribal courts and by federal courts
within proper bounds. The treaties’ terms could provide clear guidance
regarding the extent of tribal jurisdiction and the extent of federal
jurisdiction relating to matters when civil jurisdiction implicates: tribal
territory, tribal citizens, tribal court jurisdiction, U.S. citizens, and federal
court jurisdiction.
Rather than allow the U.S. Supreme Court to whole cloth create
common law doctrines extending federal jurisdiction ungrounded in the
U.S. Constitution or federal law, the treaty-making authority of the United
States would be an appropriate alternative to realign the governmental
understandings involving tribal court and federal court jurisdiction vis-à-vis
each other. 196 By re-engaging the treaty-making process, the overreach of the
federal courts and the uncertainty around enforcement of tribal court
judgments in those same courts would be settled through sovereign consent.
As an initial matter in such a treaty process, the United States
Supreme Court should abandon the circular reasoning the Court previously
used to limit the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts. Tribal civil jurisdiction
should extend to the limits of the tribal territorial boundaries and be fairly
applicable to all who enter the tribal territory. 197 In recognizing the
competency and cultural importance of tribal court jurisprudence, the U.S.
government, as a treaty partner, has an obligation to join together with Tribal
Nations for the benefit of justice throughout mid-North America.

See EagleWoman, Bringing Balance, supra note 8, at 704 (“Contemporary treaty-making
would most likely center on the areas that have remained controversial as the United States
has continued to expand and encroach on Indian Country. Treaty terms regarding the
jurisdiction of Tribal Nations within their territories and limits on federal and state
jurisdiction over those territories would necessarily be considered.”).
See G.A. Res. 61/295 (XXXIV), at 24 (Sept. 13, 2007) (“Indigenous peoples have the right
to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs,
spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical
systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.”).
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